ABSTRACT. Corruption in bank lending can seriously adversely affect credit allocation. Besides banking factors, national culture can also affect the corruption of bank officials. Prior studies have shown that collectivism increases bank corruption. This paper aims to assess the effects of cultural dimensions, besides collectivism, on the corruption of bank officials. Instead of using Hofstede's cultural data, this paper uses the data from the GLOBE project which is more recent and reports more cultural dimensions than Hofstede's. Using the data covering more than 3000 firms in 32 countries, this paper finds that humane orientation increases the corruption of bank officials. The effect of humane orientation on the corruption of bank officials is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. The magnitude of its effect is relatively comparable to that of collectivism.
Introduction
Financial intermediaries including banks are expected to channel funds from lenders to deserving borrowers. Corruption in bank lending, however, may divert funds to undeserving borrowers. Beck et al. (2005) found that firms reporting being constrained by the corruption of bank officials tend to have lower growth rates. Beck et al. (2006) later studied the determinants of bank corruption to find that bank supervision affects the corruption of bank officials. More specifically, bank supervisory power increases the corruption but private monitoring of banks reduces it. The determinants of bank corruption have also been examined by a number of other researchers. Barth et al. (2009) found that bank competition and information sharing lower the corruption of bank officials. Dheera-aumpon (2015) found that the minority shareholder protection can also lower the corruption of bank officials.
Factors directly related to the banking sector, however, are not the only determinants of bank corruption. Zheng et al. (2013) and El Ghoul et al. (2016) both showed that cultural dimensions, especially collectivism, affect the corruption of bank officials. Particularly, collectivism increases the corruption of bank officials. It is important to note that both of them used cultural data from Hofstede (2001) which originally reports four cultural dimensions, including collectivism, masculinity, power distance and uncertainty avoidance.
Besides the Hofstede's, the GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness Research) project is an alternative source of cultural data. It reports nine cultural dimensions. Several of them are somewhat similar to those of Hofstede's while others are new and unique to the GLOBE project. New cultural dimensions include institutional
Hypothesis 4: A country's level of humane orientation is positively related to the level of corruption of bank officials.
This paper uses the data covering more than 3000 firms in 32 countries for an ordered probit model. In agreement with Hypothesis 4, the results indicate that humane orientation increases the corruption of bank officials. The results, however, do not support other hypotheses. The effect of humane orientation on the corruption of bank officials is not only statistically significant but also economically significant. When humane orientation increases from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of the sample, the probability that an average firm will rate the corruption of bank officials as a major obstacle increases by 2.9 percentage points. Given that there is only 9% of firms rate the corruption of bank officials as a major obstacle, this 2.9-percentage point increase is relatively large. Also, this magnitude is quite large when compared to a 3.8-percentage point increase in the case of in-group collectivism. The results, therefore, suggest that a firm in a country with a high degree of humane orientation tends to face more corruption of bank officials. In other words, a firm in a society in which individuals are highly altruistic, friendly, caring, and kind to others tends to encounter more corruption of bank officials.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and the model. Section 2 presents the results and the last section concludes.
Data and Model

Data and Variables
In order to study the effect of humane orientation on bank corruption, this paper collects data in the same manner as Zheng et al. (2013) and El Ghoul et al. (2016) . The sources of data and the descriptions of variables are as follows.
Corruption of Bank Officials
In this paper, corruption in bank lending is measured by firm responses to the relevant survey question from the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) conducted by the World Bank between late 1999 and early 2000. This survey includes both developed and developing countries, and covers firms of all sizes. The dependent variable, Bank Corruption, is constructed from the survey question asking the management of a firm to rate how problematic the corruption of bank officials is for the firm's operation and growth. The response takes a value of one if the answer is no obstacle, a value of two if it is minor obstacle, a value of three if it is moderate obstacle, and the value of four if it is major obstacle. It is important to note that the corruption of bank officials is different from the need for special connections with banks as shown by Dheera-aumpon (2013 Dheera-aumpon ( , 2016 .
Cultural Dimensions
The GLOBE project cultural data are taken from House et al. (2004) . Cultural dimensions from House et al. (2004) include (1) In-Group Collectivism, (2) Institutional Collectivism, (3) Assertiveness, (4) Gender Egalitarianism, (5) Power Distance, (6) Uncertainty Avoidance, (7) Future Orientation, (8) Performance Orientation, and (9) Humane Orientation. Five of them are to some extent similar to those of Hofstede (2001 Given that bank corruption is more likely to be determined by how bank officials and their peers behave, the practices scores are rather appropriate and thus employed.
Other Country-Level and Firm-Level Control Variables
To control for bank supervision and bank competition, other country-level variables are introduced. Bank supervision variables are obtained from Barth et al. (2004) and include Supervisory Power and Private Monitoring. Supervisory Power measures the extent to which official bank supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. Private Monitoring measures private sector monitoring of banks. Both variables are the first principal components of pertinent dummy variables, with higher values indicating powerful bank supervision, and extensive private monitoring of banks, respectively. Bank Concentration which is taken from Beck et al. (2004) proxies for bank competition. It is the share of the assets held by the three largest banks in each country, averaged over 1995-1999. To control for firm characteristics, firm-level variables are also introduced. Sales is the natural logarithm of firm sales. Government and Foreign dummy variables take a value of one if the government and foreign entities own any share of the firm, respectively, and zero otherwise. Manufacturing and Services dummy variables take a value of one if the firm is in the manufacturing sector and the service sector, respectively, and zero otherwise. Export dummy variable takes a value of one if the firm exports, and zero otherwise. The Number of Competitors represents the number of competitors the firm encounters in its main market.
To check the robustness of the results, several additional country-level control variables will be introduced later on. Growth is the growth rate of GDP obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI), averaged over 1995-1999. Inflation used as a proxy for monetary instability is the log difference of consumer price index taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS), averaged over 1995-1999. Private Credit obtained from Beck et al. (2004) is the share of claims by financial institutions on the private sector in GDP and is used as a measure of financial development. Anti-Director taken from Djankov et al. (2008) is an index measuring the protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by management. Rule of Law obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2010) is an index measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. Financing Constraint taken from the WBES is a firm's response to the question how problematic the external financing is for the firm's operation and growth. General Corruption obtained from the WBES is a firm's response to the question how problematic the general corruption is for the firm's operation and growth.
The combined data include 3029 firms covering 32 countries including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, and Zambia. Table A1 in Appendix A.
Model and Method
A firm's underlying response to the pertinent survey question is assumed to be described by the following equation:
Bank Beck et al. (2006) , standard errors are clustered at the country level. Specifically, error terms are allowed to be correlated across firms within the same country but are required to be independent across countries. The pseudo R-squared which is a measure of goodness of fit of the model is also reported.
Results
Effects of Culture on Bank Corruption
The results from ordered probit regressions of Bank Corruption on various cultural dimensions are reported in Table 2 . Besides four cultural dimensions including Institutional Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism, Performance Orientation, and Humane Orientation, other cultural dimensions, other country-level controls and firm-level controls are introduced into the regressions. Table A1 in Appendix A. The errors are clustered at the country level. Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
In the first specification, all cultural dimension and controls are included. The coefficient of Humane Orientation is positive and statistically significant at 10 percent level. This indicates that firms in a country with a high degree of humane orientation face more corruption of bank officials. In-Group Collectivism also enters positively and significantly at 1 percent level. Consistent with Zheng et al. (2013) , this confirms that firms in a country with Among other control variables, only Government always enters negatively and significantly. This indicates that firms with government ownership tend to face less corruption of bank officials. Other controls including Supervisory Power, Private Monitoring, Bank Concentration, Sales, Foreign, Manufacturing, Services, Export, and Number of Competitors do not always enter significantly.
In sum, the coefficient of Humane Orientation is always positive and statistically significant at 10 percent level. In accordance with Hypothesis 4, the results indicate that firms in a country with a high degree of humane orientation tend to face more corruption of bank officials. The results, however, do not support other hypotheses.
Economic Significance
Besides being statistically significant, the effect of humane orientation on bank corruption is also economically relevant. To assess the magnitude of the effect, the estimated probabilities that an average firm will rate the corruption of bank officials as no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle, and a major obstacle at different levels of Humane Orientation are computed. Humane Orientation is set at either the 25 th , 50 th or 75 th percentile of the sample while holding other variables constant at their sample means. Changes in the estimated probabilities when Humane Orientation is changed are also calculated. In order to compare the magnitude of the effect of Humane Orientation to that of In-Group Collectivism, the estimated probabilities and their changes at different levels of In-Group Collectivism are also computed. Table 3 presents the estimated probabilities and their changes based on the second specification in Table 2 . The second specification is conservatively chosen because it had the smallest coefficient of Humane Orientation. The estimates indicate that if Humane Orientation changes from the 25 th percentile (3.728) to the 75 th percentile (4.330), the probability that an average firm would rate the corruption of bank officials as a major obstacle increases from 4.6% to 7.4%. This 2.9-percentage-point increase is relatively large as only 9% of firms in the sample rated the corruption of bank officials as a major obstacle. This 2.9-percentage-point increase is also quite large when compared to a 3.8-percentage-point increases resulting from a change in In-Group Collectivism. This confirms that the effect of humane orientation on bank corruption is economically significant. In sum, the results confirm that there is a significant and positive association between a country's level of humane orientation and the level of corruption of bank officials. 
Robustness Checks
To checks the robustness of the results, several additional country-level variables will be introduced into the regressions as additional controls. Table 4 presents the results from these regressions. In the first column, Growth which is the growth rate of GDP is introduced. Growth enters negatively but not significantly. Humane Orientation still enters positively and significantly at 5 percent level. In the second column, Inflation which is the rate of inflation is introduced. While Inflation enters positively and significantly, Humane Orientation still enters positively and significantly at 5 percent level. In the third column, Private Credit which is a measure of financial development is introduced. In the forth specification, Anti-Director which is an index of minority shareholder protection is introduced. Private Credit and AntiDirector enter negatively and positively but both not significantly. Humane Orientation still enters positively and significantly. In the fifth specification, Rule of Law which is a measure of institutional development is introduced. While Rule of Law enters negatively and significantly, Humane Orientation still enters positively and significantly at 5 percent level.
Because Bank Corruption is a firm's response to a survey question, it may suffer from a perception bias. The regressions may also suffer from an omitted-variable bias. In the sixth and the seventh columns, Financing Constraint and General Corruption which are firm's responses to different but related survey questions are introduced. They are chosen because if there is a perception bias they are probably biased in the same way as Bank Corruption. Also, they are likely to be determined by a comparable set of explanatory variables. By including these variables, any perception bias and any omitted-variable bias should be reduced. While Financing Constraint and General Corruption enter positively and significantly, Humane Orientation still enters positively and significantly. Table A1 in Appendix A. The errors are clustered at the country level. Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Table A1 in Appendix A. In the first column, the last two categories of Bank Corruption are grouped so that there are three categories. In the second column, he last three categories of Bank Corruption are grouped so that there are only two categories and the probit model is employed instead. In the third column, only firms receiving bank financing are included. In the forth column, only firms receiving no bank financing are included. The errors are clustered at the country level. Robust clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. Because the responses to the survey question are not quite evenly distributed across four categories and there are relatively small numbers of firms in some categories, there may be a concern regarding the reliability of the results. In particular, 65%, 17%, 9%, and 9% of firms responded that the corruption of bank officials is no obstacle, a minor obstacle, a moderate obstacle and a major obstacle, respectively. In the first and the second columns of Table 5 , the last two categories are grouped and the last three categories are grouped to make the distribution more even. There may be a concern that the results are driven by disgruntled borrowers who cannot get bank financing. In the third and forth columns of Table 5 , the sample is split into two subsamples -one with only firms that receive bank financing and one with only firms that do not receive bank financing. The results in Table 5 show that Humane Orientation still enters positively and significantly.
In sum, the results so far are robust and indicate in accordance with Hypothesis 4 that an average firm in a country with a high degree of humane orientation tends to come across more corruption of bank officials.
Conclusion
This paper aims to evaluate the effects of cultural dimensions beside of collectivism on the corruption of bank officials. Different from prior studies that use Hofstede's cultural data, this paper uses cultural data from the GLOBE project. Hofstede originally reports four cultural dimensions while the GLOBE project reports nine dimensions. Some of them are similar whereas others are new and unique to the GLOBE project. New cultural dimensions include institutional collectivism, gender egalitarianism, performance orientation and humane orientation. It is likely that those four new cultural dimensions also affect the corruption of bank officials.
The results indicate that humane orientation increases the corruption of bank officials. The effect of humane orientation on the corruption of bank officials is not only statistically significant but also economically relevant. The magnitude of the effect is quite comparable to that of collectivism. The results are robust to controlling for other factors and are not driven by a perception bias, by the distribution of the survey responses or by disgruntled borrowers. The results, therefore, confirm that a firm in a country with a high level of humane orientation tends to face more corruption of bank officials. In other words, a firm in a society in which individuals are highly altruistic, friendly, caring, and kind to others tends to encounter more corruption of bank officials. To curb the corruption of bank officials, policymakers thus should pay special attention to countries with a high level of humane orientation as they tend to have more corruption in bank lending.
